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A history of substantial flows of people, goods, capital, ideas, and institu-
tions binds the European Union (EU) and New Zealand. In October 2016, 
the comprehensive character of bilateral relations was reaffirmed with the 
signing of a Partnership Agreement on Relations and Cooperation (PARC). 
This treaty-level agreement will serve as a framework for future joint en-
deavours in a number of areas and may also pave the way for a free-trade 
agreement (FTA).
 • Despite the vast geographical space separating the EU and New Zealand, bilat-
eral relations are fairly dense and diverse, having clearly outgrown the “trade 
only” stage.
 • Shared values and interests make New Zealand a well-regarded partner of the 
EU – at the bilateral level, in the regional context of the South Pacific, and on 
the international stage.
 • The PARC may well pave the way to a bilateral FTA, though this cannot be taken 
for granted given the rise of anti-globalist sentiments in the EU.
 • The United Kingdom accounts for a considerable share of the EU’s trade, in-
vestment, travel, migration, and other links with New Zealand. Brexit will thus 
hurt the EU’s relations with New Zealand – how much depends on the specific 
details of the divorce.
Policy Implications
While there are multifold rationales for an FTA with New Zealand, the benefits of 
such an agreement for EU citizens/consumers need to be clearly spelled out and 
public concerns need to be addressed when negotiating the FTA. Beyond trade, 
substantial scope exists for close EU–New Zealand collaboration in areas such as 
research and innovation. Given New Zealand’s status as a significant maritime 
nation, particular attention should be paid to cooperation on maritime affairs 
including and cutting across policy areas from climate change to security gov-
ernance. 
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Putting EU–New Zealand Relations into Context
During the past two decades, the EU has signed a host of treaty-level agreements 
governing political and economic relations with partner countries in its neighbour-
hood and in other world regions. No EU partner country is located further away 
than New Zealand – nearly 19,000 kilometres and a travel time of more than 24 
hours separate Brussels and Wellington. Despite the vast geographical space sepa-
rating the two sides, bilateral relations are fairly dense and diverse. Long-standing 
historical ties of a political, economic, social, and cultural nature bind the EU and 
New Zealand together. Significant local adaptation notwithstanding, the institu-
tional legacies of British rule as well as more recent institutional imports from Eu-
rope, such as a German-style mixed electoral system, shape New Zealand’s political 
system, while waves of migration from Europe have contributed in important ways 
to New Zealand’s social and cultural fabric. Building on this history of substantial 
flows of people, goods, capital, ideas, and institutions, New Zealand and the EU are 
in the process of effectively moving towards a comprehensive partnership. In the 
following, we take stock of the relationship, starting with a discussion of political 
and diplomatic relations before moving to trade, investment, tourism, and migra-
tion flows. In this context, we also address the rationale for and prospects of a bilat-
eral free-trade agreement (FTA). In our conclusions we highlight, against the back-
drop of the planned departure of the United Kingdom (UK) from the EU (Brexit), 
promising fields of future cooperation between the EU and New Zealand. [1] 
Institutionalised Political and Diplomatic Relations
Official ties between New Zealand and the EU have existed for well over 50 years. 
Diplomatic contacts were formally established in 1961, when a New Zealand ambas-
sador became accredited to the then European Economic Community (EEC). New 
Zealand’s interest in closer contact with the EEC was stimulated by the UK’s inter-
est in joining the EEC and the possible ramifications of this for New Zealand’s close 
trade ties with the former “motherland” (Holland and Kelly 2012). New Zealand’s 
relations with individual EU member states have traditionally focused on the UK 
and the two big EU core countries Germany and France. 
Diplomatic and political relations between New Zealand and the EU, at both 
the supranational level and the level of individual member states, have become 
much more organisationally developed and structured over the past few decades. 
Important steps in this regard were taken with the opening of New Zealand embas-
sies in Athens, Bonn, Brussels, and Rome in the 1960s and more recently also in 
other capital cities such as Madrid, Stockholm, or Warsaw. Of the 28 EU member 
states, eight have embassies in Wellington and 15 other member states are being 
accredited to New Zealand. There are also close to 50 consuls general and honorary 
consuls representing EU countries in New Zealand’s main cities. The collective EU 
diplomatic presence in New Zealand started with the accreditation of the European 
Commission Delegation in Canberra to New Zealand in 1984. In 2004, a direct dip-
lomatic presence was established in Wellington, and six years later the Commission 
Delegation was transformed, in the context of the establishment of a joint EU Exter-
1 This briefing paper 
draws on research by 
the author that will be 
published in a book 
co-edited by Robert G. 
Patman and Iati Iati entitled 
New Zealand and the 
World (Singapore: World 
Scientific Publishing, 
forthcoming). The author 
is grateful to the editors 
and the publisher for their 
kind permission to use the 
material.
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nal Action Service, into the European Union’s Delegation to New Zealand (Holland 
and Kelly 2012). In September 2016, the Delegation became a full mission led by a 
resident ambassador. Consultations between the EU and New Zealand at the level 
of political leaders, ministers, commissioners, and parliamentarians are frequent, 
and annual meetings of senior officials alternate between Brussels and Wellington. 
The diplomatic and political relations between New Zealand and the EU are also 
characterised by the increasing complexity of the issues at play. Given the strong 
economic thrust of the initial European integration project and New Zealand’s long-
standing quest to secure access to the European market for its exports, particularly 
agricultural products, it is not surprising that relations have until recently focused 
very much on trade and other economic matters, including quotas and regulatory 
issues. As an EU paper on relations with New Zealand put it bluntly some years ago: 
“Trade is a dominant feature of the bilateral relationship” (EEAS 2008). Indeed, 
many of the 15 bilateral agreements signed since 1980 by New Zealand and the 
EU (and its institutional precursors) deal with trade and business-relevant matters 
such as trade in cheese, mutton, lamb, and goat meat; sanitary, phytosanitary, and 
health issues; air services; and the mutual recognition of conformity assessments.
The Expanding Scope of EU–New Zealand Cooperation
Still, both the range of multilateral treaties, conventions, and protocols signed by 
the EU and New Zealand on issues such as climate protection and combating cor-
ruption or transnational organised crime as well as the issues covered in more re-
cent bilateral agreements indicate that the scope of mutual interests, concerns, and 
cooperation is expanding. As a result, there are now sectoral dialogues involving 
officials from both sides on issues such as human rights and science and technol-
ogy. Moreover, both sides also participate in the annual meetings of the ASEAN 
Regional Forum and in the bi-regional Asia–Europe Meeting process. The two sides 
also share a particular interest in regional cooperation, sustainable development, 
and stability in the South Pacific. Both the EU and New Zealand are important pro-
viders of development assistance for the nations in the South Pacific. Together with 
Australia, they have been engaged since 2008 in trilateral consultations on develop-
ment cooperation in the region. They both also work together within the framework 
of the EU–Pacific Islands Forum, where issues of climate change mitigation and 
adaptation have featured prominently in recent years.
The basic foundation for developing bilateral relations in recent years has been 
the 2007 EU–New Zealand Joint Declaration on Relations and Cooperation, which 
superseded the first Joint EU–New Zealand Declaration signed in 1999. Underscor-
ing the growing scope of issues at play, the 2007 declaration devoted only seven 
of 46 paragraphs dealing with the substance of the bilateral relations to trade and 
economic matters. The Joint Declaration was followed by a bilateral agreement on 
scientific and technological cooperation as well as two agreements dealing with se-
curity issues. The latter included one very specific agreement signed in 2007 that 
concerned New Zealand’s participation in the civilian EU Police Mission in Afghani-
stan – as one of four non-EU countries, New Zealand contributed police officers to 
the mission – and one agreement covering New Zealand’s participation in military 
crisis management operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. A much broader frame-
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work agreement governing the participation of New Zealand in EU crisis manage-
ment operations followed in 2012. 
Building on the Joint Declaration and the subsequent bilateral agreements, the 
EU and New Zealand agreed in 2009 to further elevate the bilateral relationship by 
means of a comprehensive and legally binding EU–New Zealand treaty-level agree-
ment. Formal negotiations on this Partnership Agreement on Relations and Coop-
eration (PARC) took place between 2012 and 2014. After some legal “scrubbing” of 
the text, EU High Representative Frederica Mogherini and New Zealand Foreign 
Minister Murray McCully finally signed the PARC in October 2016. This 60-article-
strong document covers the whole gamut of bilateral cooperation and dialogue in 
ten sections, if not from A to Z, then at least from A for agriculture, rural develop-
ment and forestry (Article 49), and animal welfare (Article 16) to T for transport 
(Article 48) or tourism (Article 28). Particularly lengthy and detailed articles con-
cern cooperation in combating terrorism (Article 11), dialogue on economic and 
trade matters (Article 14), education and training (Article 40), energy (Article 47), 
and fisheries and maritime affairs (Article 50) (EEAS 2016). 
The official discourse on EU–New Zealand cooperation, as displayed in offi-
cial documents and statements by high-level representatives, emphasises the like-
mindedness of the two parties. As the European External Action Service puts it: 
“The EU and New Zealand are like-minded partners who share many common val-
ues and interests and see eye-to-eye on key international and global issues” (EEAS 
n.d.). In turn, New Zealand Foreign Minister Murray McCully has called the EU “a 
partner of first order importance for New Zealand,” also noting “the high level of co-
operation with the EU in the Pacific, including on development delivery” (European 
Union 2011). Arguably, the high esteem in which the two sides hold each other has 
contributed to the institutionalisation of political and diplomatic relations between 
the EU and New Zealand over the past few decades. 
EU–New Zealand Trade Relations
While two elements of the “holy trinity” of the EU’s modern agreements with other 
countries and regions – the framework agreement for participation in EU crisis 
management operations mentioned above and an all-encompassing political agree-
ment – are now in place with New Zealand, the often invoked “like-mindedness” of 
the two sides has yet to be translated into a bilateral FTA. Prior to Britain joining 
the EEC in 1973, New Zealand’s trade was largely conducted with the UK. In view 
of the gradual phasing out of preferential trading links with the UK, New Zealand 
had to reorient its trade relations. It did so by successfully diversifying its trade re-
lationships with geographically closer Asian nations, as well as Australia.
Nevertheless, the EU has remained an important partner for New Zealand in 
terms of trade in both goods and services. In 2015, the EU was New Zealand’s third-
most-important trade partner after Australia and China. New Zealand’s trade in 
goods and services with the EU accounted for approximately NZD 20 billion in that 
year, more than one-eighth of New Zealand’s total trade. [2] The main goods ex-
ported to the EU were meat products, wine, and fruit. In the same year, the EU was 
the number one source of imports to New Zealand. Approximately 18 per cent of the 
 
2 The average value of 
the NZ dollar relative to the 
euro was 0.63 in 2015.
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goods and services imported came from the EU (Statistics New Zealand 2016a). The 
main EU merchandise items exported to New Zealand were transport equipment, 
mainly motor vehicles (close to 30 per cent of the total); machinery and appliances 
(approximately 25 per cent); and chemical and related products (European Com-
mission 2016a).
Bilateral trade between the EU and New Zealand has continued to grow in re-
cent years. According to EU statistics, EU imports increased on average by 2.2 per 
cent annually between 2011 and 2015, while EU exports to New Zealand increased 
by 7.4 per cent. New Zealand was the EU’s fiftieth most important trading part-
ner worldwide in 2015, with 0.2 per cent of total EU trade being conducted with 
New Zealand. New Zealand has run a trade deficit with the EU since 2011, which 
amounted to EUR 1.1 billion in 2015 (European Commission 2016a). Slightly less 
than half of the deficit with the EU derived in 2015 from New Zealand’s bilateral 
trade with Germany, its most important trade partner within the bloc. In 2015, New 
Zealand’s trade with Germany amounted to over NZD 3.1 billion, while trade with 
the UK stood at NZD 3 billion. The fairly balanced trade with the UK accounted for 
approximately 21 per cent of New Zealand’s total trade with the EU (Statistics New 
Zealand 2016a) and thus, reflecting the long-standing trade ties between the two 
countries, a higher share than the UK’s contribution to the EU’s total external trade 
(close to 13 per cent for exports and 15 per cent for imports in 2015). 
The Rationale for and Prospects of an FTA
New Zealand has long desired a bilateral FTA with the EU. As New Zealand’s minis-
ter of trade, Tim Groser, noted in 2014 in a letter to EU Trade Commissioner Cecilia 
Malmström, “New Zealand is now one of only six WTO members without a prefer-
ential access arrangement to the EU either concluded or under negotiation. This is 
out of keeping with our otherwise warm political relationship” (Groser 2014). In the 
absence of an FTA, New Zealand is at a disadvantage in terms of market access to 
the EU relative to some competitors. Given the political sensitivity of free trade in 
agricultural products for a number of member states, the EU has long been reluc-
tant to initiate negotiations on such an agreement with New Zealand (or Australia 
for that matter). [3] However, in view of the upcoming PARC and given New Zea-
land’s record of having successfully negotiated a number of high-quality FTAs with 
EU competitors such as China and South Korea, the EU and New Zealand commit-
ted in October 2015 to start the process of bilateral FTA negotiations. 
Formal preparations got underway in early 2016 with public consultation pro-
cesses on both sides. The EU Commission is in fact preparing to negotiate free-
trade agreements with both New Zealand and Australia, with the one with New 
Zealand leading the way. According to the roadmap presented by the EU Commis-
sion in early 2016, the Commission could request permission from the European 
Council to begin FTA negotiations in the first part of 2017 (European Commission 
2016b). The Commission’s preparations – impact assessment and scoping – for the 
negotiations with New Zealand and Australia have been unaffected by the outcome 
of the June 2016 referendum in the UK on leaving the EU. If anything, the spectre of 
Brexit has provided impetus for trade officials to conclude and ratify pending trade 
3 New Zealand’s agricul-
tural exports to the EU do 
not, however, include prod-
ucts that exacerbate core 
EU sensitivities, such as 
grains or sugar. Also, the 
EU has already liberalised 
key New Zealand export 
items such as sheep meat 
and wool. Furthermore, 
there are strong seasonal 
complementarities or spe-
cialisations with respect to 
other agricultural products 
that New Zealand exports 
to the EU (see Lee-Maki-
yama 2015: 6–9). 
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pacts sooner rather than later. However, given the rise of anti-globalisation senti-
ments (not only) in the EU, which in October 2016 nearly scuttled the signing of a 
trade pact between the EU and Canada (CETA), the more important question these 
days is whether an FTA between the EU and New Zealand will be sellable in all the 
EU member states, which also need to agree to the final deal.
Despite New Zealand’s limited importance for the EU’s external trade, conclud-
ing an FTA with New Zealand is arguably of interest to the EU on a number of 
counts. First, such an FTA could serve as a blueprint for future FTAs with partners 
in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. The content and explanation of such FTAs should 
address not only tariff issues, non-tariff barriers, and regulatory cooperation but 
also public concerns about trade- and investment-related issues (e.g. concerning 
data privacy, consumer protection, labour standards, or the investor-state dispute 
settlement system). The fact that such concerns are shared by many citizens in the 
EU and New Zealand as well as the already high level of regulatory cooperation 
between the two sides, even with regard to sensitive issues such as data privacy, 
provide good starting points, which do not exist with many other countries, for ne-
gotiations (cf. Lee-Makiyama 2015: 11–13).
Second, an FTA with New Zealand would open up opportunities for additional 
market access and provide links to existing trade pacts. New Zealand is not only 
connected to Australia by a common market scheme – the Closer Economic Rela-
tions (CER) agreement, which represents one of the world’s rare cases of deep re-
gional integration – but also boasts a number of comprehensive FTAs with partners 
such as China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) with which 
the EU does not have FTAs. Indeed, due to its persistent, pragmatic, incremen-
tal, and multilaterally attuned approach to trade diplomacy over the past few dec-
ades, New Zealand is now enmeshed in a web of FTAs in the Asia-Pacific (see Leslie 
2015), making it an attractive potential partner for the EU. An FTA with New Zea-
land could provide additional opportunities at the micro level for EU enterprises in 
Oceania and East Asia and could also provide a stepping stone at the macro level for 
wider interregional trade cooperation.
Third, given the EU’s and New Zealand’s expertise and experience in achieving 
high-quality FTAs as well as the already high degree of trade-related liberalisation 
and harmonisation between the two sides, there is the possibility that a bilateral 
FTA could be negotiated in a relatively swift and clean fashion. As Lee-Makiyama 
(2015: 9) has argued, if an FTA cannot be agreed upon with New Zealand, it can-
not be agreed upon at all. With the EU’s ability to deliver in terms of external trade 
diplomacy – a core area of European integration – in doubt in recent times, the 
successful conclusion and ratification of an FTA with New Zealand could help re-
build trust and regain momentum in this policy domain. An EU–New Zealand FTA 
could be used to seek a new equilibrium between technocratic ambition on the one 
hand and public concerns on the other. Such an FTA will have to be more creative 
and more ambitious with respect to addressing citizen concerns about trade- and 
investment-related issues.
Also, given the public outcry in a number of EU member states about the secret 
character of negotiations between the EU and the US over the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the EU Commission and member states will 
need to discuss and decide on how much (more) information will be made available 
to the public before and during the envisaged FTA negotiations with New Zealand 
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and Australia. Preparations for the trade pact might thus take longer than antici-
pated but will be vital for the trade pact to gain public approval and thus stand a 
chance of ratification. In a nutshell, the public will need to be convinced that such 
an FTA will be beneficial for them and not just for some vested interests. While an 
EU–New Zealand FTA has finally moved into sight with the signing of the PARC, 
actually concluding an FTA will still require proper preparation and explanation.
Direct Investment, Tourism, and Migration
In terms of accumulated foreign direct investment (FDI), the EU ranks second in 
importance for New Zealand, trailing Australia by a wide margin. At the end of 2015, 
the total stock of EU FDI in New Zealand amounted to NZD 8.3 billion or close to 
9 per cent of the total. By country, most FDI from the EU has originated from the 
UK (NZD 4.2 billion), followed by the Netherlands (NZD 3.5 billion). In terms of 
New Zealand’s overseas direct investment (ODI), the EU has been the third-most 
important destination for such investment, with accumulated ODI amounting to 
NZD 2.9 billion  or 11.4 per cent of the total stock at the end of 2015. More than half 
of New Zealand’s ODI in the EU has gone to the UK (Statistics New Zealand 2016a).
Tourism is of vital importance to New Zealand’s economy, contributing in di-
rect and indirect terms over 8 per cent of the country’s GDP. Growth in the tour-
ism sector has in recent years been driven by the increasing number of Asian, in 
particular Chinese, visitors to New Zealand. Still, the number of visitors from the 
EU remains high and continues to grow. According to New Zealand statistics, ap-
proximately 463,000 people from Europe visited the country in 2015, making it 
the third-largest source of worldwide visitors after Oceania and Asia but before the 
Americas. By country, visitors from both the UK and Germany featured in the top 10 
in 2015 – with the UK at fourth place with close to 204,000 visitors and Germany at 
sixth place with close to 85,000 visitors (Statistics New Zealand 2016b). 
The high number of visitors from the UK can be easily understood in light 
of New Zealand’s immigration profile. Nearly three-quarters of the population – 
roughly three million people – identify themselves as being of European ethnicity. 
A quarter of the population was born overseas. While the largest group of overseas-
born New Zealanders now hails from various parts of Asia, England still ranks at the 
top by country – well ahead of China, India, and Australia – with close to 216,000 
people, or 21.5 per cent of New Zealand’s overseas-born population, originating 
from there. The other European source of overseas-born citizens in the top 10 is 
Scotland, where close to 26,000 New Zealanders were born (Statistics New Zealand 
2013).
Permanent migration from the EU to New Zealand remains substantial. In the 
year ending March 2016, over 26,500 EU citizens resettled in New Zealand, ac-
counting for more than one-fifth of all immigrants in that year. Collectively, EU 
citizens were in fact the most important group of new immigrants, outnumbering 
Australians and Chinese. Europeans arriving on a permanent or long-term basis in 
New Zealand in 2015 included nearly 13,400 Brits, over 3,900 Germans, and close 
to 3,800 French citizens (Statistics New Zealand 2016a, 2016c). 
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Beyond Brexit: The Potential for Closer EU–New Zealand  
Cooperation
While New Zealand’s ties with Australia and various parts of Asia have grown by 
leaps and bounds in recent decades, the EU undoubtedly remains a first-order part-
ner for New Zealand. Very substantial trade, investment, tourism, and migration 
ties continue to underpin bilateral relations. Shared values and interests also make 
New Zealand a well-regarded partner of the EU – at the bilateral level, in the re-
gional context of the South Pacific, where New Zealand features as a “middle 
power” in its own right, and on the international stage. Relations between the EU 
and New Zealand have clearly outgrown the “trade only” stage. Nevertheless, the 
UK’s planned exit from the EU will have significant ramifications for the relation-
ship. Because of the UK’s historically based special place in New Zealand’s relations 
with Europe and because the UK still accounts for a disproportionate share of the 
EU’s trade, investment, travel, migration, and other links with New Zealand, Brexit 
will undoubtedly mean a net loss for the EU’s relationship with New Zealand. Given 
the still-unclear timing and conditions of Brexit, including whether the UK will re-
main connected to the Single Market in some way or for some time, the only thing 
that can be said with certainty at this point is that New Zealand will need to negoti-
ate of host of separate agreements with the UK after Brexit has occurred – that is, 
most likely after 2019.
The spectre of Brexit notwithstanding, there is substantial scope for further 
developing relations between the EU and New Zealand. The treaty-level agreement 
signed this year is bound to serve as a launching pad for future joint endeavours in 
a number of areas and may also pave the way for a bilateral free-trade agreement. 
While the relationship between the EU and New Zealand is unlikely to evolve into 
a genuine strategic partnership (cf. Narlikar and Plagemann 2016) given New Zea-
land’s limited capacities for global engagement on a large scale, the PARC testifies 
to the comprehensive character of the bilateral relations.
Areas of cooperation with particular potential for further development include 
research and education as well as maritime affairs. For a country with a popula-
tion of 4.6 million, New Zealand boasts fairly substantial links with the EU and its 
member states in terms of research, innovation, and education. Innovation systems 
in the EU and New Zealand are in alignment, and some of the key priorities of 
publicly funded research in the EU and New Zealand are the same. The number of 
New Zealand participations within the EU Framework Programmes (FP) for Re-
search and Technological Development has significantly increased since the signing 
of the Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement in 2009. While less than 
30  participants from New Zealand took part in FP 6 (2002–2006), there were 
approximately 230 such participants in FP 7 (2007–2013), including the Marie 
Skłodowska-Curie mobility programme and joint research in the areas of food, agri-
culture and fisheries, biotechnology, information and communications technology, 
and health (European Commission 2013). The current EU Research and Innovation 
Programme, Horizon 2020 (2014–2020), which also includes public–public part-
nership networks, should see even more New Zealand participation, particularly 
given New Zealand’s expertise and interest in additional areas such as renewable 
energy, resilient structures, sustainable urban development, and Antarctic research 
(cf. European Commission 2016c: 33–34). 
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Beyond, but in some ways also linked to, cooperation in research, innovation, 
and education, there is also scope for more in-depth cooperation between New Zea-
land and the EU concerning maritime affairs. New Zealand is a significant mari-
time nation with one of the longest coastlines and also one of the largest exclusive 
economic zones (EEZs) on the globe. Future cooperation and dialogue between 
the EU and New Zealand should better reflect shared maritime and marine inter-
ests, as well as responsibilities, by addressing issues across a range of policy areas 
including, but certainly not limited to, climate change (e.g. ocean acidification), 
energy (e.g. generation of energy from ocean currents), natural disaster manage-
ment (e.g. the improvement of relevant governance structures in the South Pacific), 
research and innovation (e.g. aquaculture, ocean monitoring), security governance 
(e.g. peaceful settlement of maritime disputes), and the sustainable development of 
the marine environment (incl. conservation, protection, and rehabilitation of ocean 
ecosystems). While such issues can be addressed on an issue-by-issue basis, a more 
integrated approach could build on existing and yet-to-be-established framework 
policies for ocean governance in the EU and New Zealand. A comprehensive mari-
time partnership between the EU and New Zealand could form a bedrock of bilat-
eral relations in the years to come.
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